Accounting Historians Journal
Volume 29
Issue 2 December 2002

Article 7

2002

Historian as auditor: Facts, judgments and evidence
Christopher J. Napier

Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons

Recommended Citation
Napier, Christopher J. (2002) "Historian as auditor: Facts, judgments and evidence," Accounting Historians
Journal: Vol. 29 : Iss. 2 , Article 7.
Available at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Archival Digital Accounting Collection at eGrove. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Accounting Historians Journal by an authorized editor of eGrove. For more
information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.

Napier: Historian as auditor: Facts, judgments and evidence
Accounting Historians Journal
Vol. 29, No. 2
December 2002

INTERFACES
Christopher J. Napier
UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON

THE HISTORIAN AS AUDITOR:
FACTS, JUDGMENTS AND EVIDENCE
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Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity (London: Routledge,
1999). C. B. McCullagh, The Truth of History (London:
Routledge, 1998).
Abstract: Both history and auditing are “evidence-based” practices.
Accounting historians, who may be skilled in audit as well as historical research, may have special insights into how sources provide evidence to support judgments and opinions. Considerations of evidence
by theorists of history may be of relevance to theorists of auditing,
and vice versa. The work in this area of recent historiographers Richard Evans, Keith Jenkins and Behan McCullagh is reviewed.
McCullagh’s claim that fairness as well as truth is central to making
historical judgments is shown to resonate with the work of auditors
and hence is of particular significance to historians of accounting.

INTRODUCTION
“In practice most historians assume that when their statements about the past are adequately supported by available evidence, then it is reasonable to believe them true. Precisely what
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constitutes adequate support is hard to say” [McCullagh, 1984,
p. 1]. Debates about evidence are common in the historical literature, and have entered the arena of historical accounting research. For example, one of the key issues in the recent discussion on the emergence of cost and management accounting in
The Accounting Historians Journal [Hoskin and Macve, 2000;
Boyns and Edwards, 2000; Tyson, 2000] is the extent to which
evidence exists that supports or contradicts particular historical
interpretations. Within this debate, both general claims about
the ability of evidence to resolve theoretical issues and more
specific claims about the sufficiency and cogency of particular
pieces of evidence offered in support of historical statements are
presented and rebutted.
Historians have long had to struggle with the problems of
what might count as an acceptable source (until relatively recently, for example, oral material was considered to provide
only poor and unreliable evidence [Hammond and Sikka, 1996,
p. 82]), how reliable might any individual source be, how to deal
with multiple and possibly conflicting sources, how many independent sources were enough (and when were sources truly independent) and to what extent more general statements could
be justified on the basis of particular sources. By the end of the
19th century, a substantial body of techniques of source criticism and comparison had developed, although the precepts propounded by theorists searching for a scientific basis to historical
study are by no means uncontroversial (Howell and Prevenier,
2001, p. 70). Some precepts rely on the exercise of the individual
historian’s “common sense”, and while this may well be highly
refined as a result of extensive practice, it is not, in terms of
logic, a firm foundation for historical judgments.
The debate over the nature of historical evidence, and the
way in which evidence mediates between facts and judgments, is
still current within the historiographical literature. In this paper, I refer to the recent contributions of three historical theorizers (Richard Evans, Keith Jenkins and C. Behan McCullagh)
to shed light on how historians use traces of the past as evidence
in support of their statements of fact and their judgments. Accounting historians use accounting records as evidence of past
practices and to help form judgments about the nature and role
of accounting in earlier periods. Accounting records are also
used as evidence in one of the main activities of the professional
accountant – auditing. Parallels exist between auditing and history-writing, and insights into the nature of evidence in one
activity are informative in the context of the other. At a more
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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mundane level, the auditor’s training provides knowledge of
how accounting systems operate and the relationships between
different types of document and record, which are potentially
valuable in using archives effectively, while the historian’s training in both use of sources and the extent to which they adequately support judgments carries over usefully into the auditing arena.
The present paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I put the significance of evidence into a broader philosophical context by viewing evidence as an aspect of epistemology. This is followed by a section in which the processes of
historical research and criticism on the one hand, and financial
reporting and auditing on the other, are compared. Reference is
made to the recent work of the historian Richard Evans, principally his historiographical polemic In Defence of History [1997].
I then turn to the writings of Keith Jenkins. Through his books
Re-thinking History [1991], On “What is History?” [1995] and
Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity [1999], and his edited
collection The Postmodern History Reader [1997], Jenkins has
provocatively challenged more mainstream views of the
historian’s relationship with evidence, indeed the nature of historical evidence itself, in ways that raise issues for the conventional understanding of evidence in the audit context. The arguments of Jenkins are contrasted with those of C. Behan
McCullagh, whose The Truth of History [1998] explicitly explores
the extent to which historical descriptions can be “true and fair”,
and thus suggests a direct analogy between the task of the historian and that of the auditor. In conclusion, I draw out the extent
to which the analogy between auditing and history proposed in
the paper provides insights into our understanding of the nature
of evidence in either context.
EVIDENCE AND EPISTEMOLOGY
In any practice that claims to make or critique statements
about the way the world is or was, two fundamental epistemological questions arise. The first of these is: “by virtue of what
factors are our statements true or false?” The second question is:
“when is it reasonable to believe statements to be true or false?”
These are not necessarily the same question, as it is possible to
conceive of situations where it is reasonable to believe a statement to be true, but the statement is in fact false. In history, for
example, all sources extant at a particular date may support a
particular historical statement, but later historians may gain acPublished by eGrove, 2002
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cess to material that not only contradicts the earlier sources but
suggests that they are not to be relied on. More generally, if we
try to determine whether beliefs are reasonable using a mechanistic approach, we will have to use a finite set of criteria, but so
far philosophers have been successful in constructing statements that satisfy all the criteria but are nonetheless false. This
problem of determining a completely adequate foundation for
justification parallels that for deciding whether we can be said
to know some proposition or statement, where philosophers
have made a sport of developing counter-examples to any attempts to explain knowledge by reference to criteria such as
justification, belief and truth [Lehrer, 1990, pp. 16-17, following
Gettier, 1963].
In our everyday lives, we believe certain statements, and
deny others, for a wide range of reasons, and both the statements we believe, and our grounds for belief, differ from one
person to another. Even though our personal standards for what
philosophers call “justification” differ, we expect common standards within arenas of shared activity, particularly within professional domains involving the making of statements. The
worlds of the historian and the auditor are two such domains. In
recent years, both historians and auditors have come under
challenge. This challenge does not relate to particular instances
of inadequate history or auditing, although there have been
plenty of claims about both of these. The problem goes deeper:
it is argued that historians can never be completely justified in
believing that their accounts of the past are true, while auditors
can never be sure that their audit opinion (that financial statements “fairly present” or “give a true and fair view of” the underlying financial position and performance of an entity) is
valid. Michael Power in particular has pointed out how auditing,
rather than being a “derived and neutral activity” [Power, 1996,
p. 289], “actively constructs the legitimacy of its own knowledge
base and seeks to create the environments in which this knowledge base will be successful” [Power, 1996, p. 291]. If auditing is
essentially a constructed activity, then the criteria by which auditors feel justified in asserting their audit opinions are themselves constructed rather than given, and moreover are located
in history rather than being ahistorical.
In the contemporary audit, the audit opinion is firmly
grounded in the process of gathering evidence. “Auditors should
obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence to be able to draw
reasonable conclusions on which to base the audit opinion”
[SAS 400.1: APB, 1995a, para. 2]. This begs the questions of
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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what is meant by “sufficient”, “appropriate” and “reasonable”, as
well as the processes by which the auditor draws conclusions
from the evidence and derives the audit opinion from the conclusions. Auditing Standards, textbooks and professional literature address these concepts, aiming to provide a practical response to the question: “what must an auditor do to be justified
in expressing an opinion that financial statements give a true
and fair view?” If no absolute criteria of justification exist, the
criteria developed within the context of audit practice will always be open to external challenge, and some audit judgments
may fail such challenges, especially where the challenges make
use of hindsight. Even an audit properly conducted in accordance with current best practice could fail to give rise to an
adequately justified opinion, if best practice is retrospectively
found to be inadequate by some external critic such as a court of
law.
Recently, Alexander [1999] has attempted to provide a
“benchmark” by which the adequacy of published financial
statements (rather than audit opinions) may be judged. “Our
question, in its simplest form, is: what would make, and how
can we go about establishing what would make, adequate financial statements?” [Alexander, 1999, p. 239, emphasis in original].
Alexander suggests three broad approaches to adequacy. A
preparer of a set of financial statements might assert that the
statements are adequate because they satisfy a general fundamental concept (for example, they “give a true and fair view”),
or that they have been prepared in accordance with a set of
concepts, rules or conventions (a “statement of principles”) consistently applied, or that they comply with a comprehensive and
detailed set of accounting rules in all particulars. The auditor
judges the preparer’s assertion of adequacy. At the same time,
the auditor’s judgment must itself be adequate by reference to
criteria of justification within auditing. These notions of adequacy are likely to differ from those applying to financial statements, giving rise to the situation that an auditor’s opinion on a
set of financial statements may be adequately justified even
though the statements themselves do not satisfy the criteria for
financial statement adequacy.
The relationship between the financial statements of an entity and the underlying financial transactions of the entity and
the events that have affected the entity’s financial position and
performance is a complex one. It is fundamental to financial
statements that they do indeed stand in some relationship
(sometimes described as “reflecting” or “representing”) to real
Published by eGrove, 2002
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transactions and events. The audit report comments implicitly
on the extent to which this relationship is manifested. Similarly,
most (but, as we will discover, not all) historians believe that it
is fundamental to historical statements that they stand in some
relationship to real events. In order to convince readers that
their statements are adequately justified, historians will present
evidence in support of their statements, while auditors will (or
at least should) be in a position to present sufficient appropriate
evidence to back up their opinions. In the next section, I examine more closely the role of evidence in historical research in
comparison with auditing.
AUDITORS AND HISTORIANS
When historians want to discover what happened in the
past, they feel constrained to find evidence which will
enable them to draw inferences about the people and
events which interest them. This constraint seems perfectly reasonable, because it has long been thought both
the necessary and sufficient means of discovering the
truth about the past [McCullagh, 1998, p. 20].
As McCullagh notes, statements made by historians have
traditionally been considered as requiring a grounding in evidence to be admitted into the set of statements that can potentially be true. Without evidence, the historian is free to speculate, but such speculations cannot be claimed as true in the
sense that they represent justified statements about the past.
Historians are not limited to a mere recitation of their evidence:
they may use the evidence as the basis for drawing conclusions,
so long as the latter are adequately argued from the evidence. Of
course, what counts as an “adequate argument” may be open to
debate, and what is accepted as such by the majority of practising historians may change from period to period [Evans, 1997,
pp. 93-94].
In Figure 1, the process of historical research is represented
schematically. At the bottom, forming the foundation for writing
history, are the various occurrences that interest the historian.
The historian will sometimes have direct personal experience of
certain occurrences, and may actually have participated in
them, but in general the historian is reliant on the traces that
the occurrences have left: the documents and artifacts, and the
memories of participants that can be obtained through oral testimony. The historian’s evidence is in general some form of
record, but not every occurrence will be recorded, while some
apparent records may not reflect actual occurrences (they may
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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FIGURE 1
The Process of Historical Research
Historiographies

Histories

Structured traces: archives

Unstructured traces: documentary, oral, artifacts

Activities, occurrences, happenings, events

have been created in error or as a deliberate attempt to misrepresent what had occurred). To the present-day professional historian, such primary sources form the basis for historical narratives and interpretations, and gaining an understanding of
where potentially relevant records may be found, how they may
be read, and how reliable particular records may be in providing
evidence of what happened, form a central part of the training
of historians [Black and McRaild, 2000; Howell and Prevenier,
2001; Marius, 1999]. In practice, the primary records utilized by
the historian may have been put into structured form, usually in
archives but also in published volumes.1 While the archiving
1
The latter often applies in the case of original documents that present-day
scholars will find difficult to read without specialist training. Hence many medieval documents have been transcribed and historians may tend to use the transcriptions rather than the originals (for example, Noke [1981] in his study of
medieval English manorial accounts, uses several sets of transcribed records). In
his study of the records of the East India Company, Bryer [2000] makes use of
the Calendars of State Papers, which transcribe, and on occasion summarize,
original documents.

Published by eGrove, 2002
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process introduces structure and order to primary documents, it
may lead to the loss of certain documents that do not fit the
archivist’s scheme of arrangement, or for which the archivist
may deem that space is not available. Archiving may provide an
opportunity for documents to be deliberately retained or removed in order to emphasize certain aspects of the past and
suppress others.
The upward-pointing arrows in Figure 1 indicate the increasing selectivity and abstraction in the move from the original occurrences to the historians’ narratives and interpretations.
At each stage, detail may be lost and agreement between the
documents and the underlying events may be blurred. The vertically-striped downward-pointing arrows in Figure 1 show the
extent to which histories are based on the underlying evidence.
In practice, much historical writing is grounded in the archive.
Historians’ professional reputations may be made by locating
hitherto unused material that has been ordered in an archive, or
even unstructured material (whether this is stored in an archive
or not).2 Access to the actual events in which the historian is
interested is a more problematic matter. The shadowy arrow
linking histories with occurrences is intended to indicate that,
on occasion, the historian has personal knowledge of and experience of events. But even here, the experience is mediated
through the historian’s memory, and in general this can be only
a minor and accidental source of historical evidence.
In Figure 1, the topmost box, labeled “historiographies”, indicates the extent to which histories are based not only on
sources documenting the original events but also on the work of
other historians. It is rare for a historian to be the first to investigate a particular set of occurrences, and many histories contain critiques (implicit or explicit) of the work of prior historians. Evans [1997, pp. 93-94] suggests that the move from a
heavy reliance on the work of “chroniclers and other secondary
or derivative sources” to a “practice of always going to the pri-

2
Evans [1997, pp. 87-88] tells of how, in working in the Hamburg state
archives, he came across a catalogue entry for “Worthless Reports”. On investigating, he found that this entry represented some 20,000 unclassified police
reports from the 1890s and 1900s, which provided a wealth of information about
the thoughts of “rank-and-file socialist workers . . . about almost every conceivable issue of the day”. Evans notes that the records had survived by luck rather
than conscious decision, and that the records became significant as evidence of
the past only when historians became interested in the history of everyday life
rather than of political organisations.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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mary or original sources” in the early-19th century has been
widely associated with the emergence of history “on a professional or scientific basis”. Each history does not stand alone,
based entirely on original sources. Rather, histories form an
ongoing “conversation” in which a new contribution may be
offered as “a useful corrective to earlier historical interpretations” [Evans, 1997, p. 88]. The basis of such a corrective may
range from hitherto unknown documents or other traces of the
past to new interpretations of a common set of evidence. It may
even involve a painstaking demolition of the historical claims of
another writer.3 In order to undertake such critiques, historians
need to appeal to standards of historical research and argumentation as well as to primary and secondary evidence. These standards change through time, and in their judgments of colleagues
and predecessors, historians need to be careful not to suggest
that previous historians were incompetent when, by the standards of their own times, they were justified in reaching their
conclusions (for example, if they used all the evidence then
available, or at least everything that then counted as evidence).
The “historiographies” box, therefore, symbolizes the extent
to which historians express opinions on the work of other historians. Although such opinions may be embedded within more
substantive works, they may also stand separately, in the form
of criticisms, reviews or surveys. Historical critics will use their
own knowledge of the archive (and of unstructured primary
sources) to challenge or endorse the use of source materials by
other historians (this is indicated by the striped downwardpointing arrow in Figure 1), and they can make criticisms on
logical grounds, or on the basis that conclusions are not adequately supported by the evidence adduced. In Figure 1, the
dependence of historiographical criticism on histories and
sources is indicated by downward-pointing arrows, and again
the shadowy arrow connecting historiographies with occurrences indicates the more problematic nature of historiographers’ access to these.
Historical research is not simply the identification, transcription and summarization of original sources as statements
of “historical fact”. The writing of history involves the making of
3
Evans [2001] himself provides one of the leading recent examples of this in
his debunking of the use of historical evidence by the holocaust denier David
Irving, arising out of Evans’s work as the leading defense expert witness in
Irving’s unsuccessful libel action against Deborah Lipstadt (author of Denying
the Holocaust [Lipstadt, 1993]) and Penguin Books.

Published by eGrove, 2002
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judgments. These take various forms, such as imputations of
motive to historical actors, identification of causes and consequences, and explanations of historical processes in terms of
theoretical concepts and constructs, These judgments may be
explicitly stated and supported in historical writings, or they
may be implicit in the way in which the historian selects from
sources and structures the historical narrative. How historians
characterize the relationship between fact and judgment, between source and interpretation, depends on perhaps unarticulated philosophical positions. Traditional historians see “interpretation emerging from the sources and finding a form of
literary expression appropriate to the truth of the argument and
the material” [Evans, 1997, p. 101]. Such historians seek to give
their readers the “best” explanation possible of the events they
study, and various canons of best practice have developed
among professional historians (see, for example, McCullagh
[1984]). These canons presuppose a core belief about the relationship of historical traces and the underlying occurrences that
they purportedly document: that, in general, and allowing for
some degree of error, the traces faithfully represent the underlying occurrences. This is not to suggest that historians are naïve
about sources: “There is a quite remarkable degree of ‘craft’
agreement among most practising historians, whatever their
varied theoretical orientations, that certain searching questions
must be put to and about the sources” [Fulbrook, 2002, p. 101].
The “craft” debate over how sources are to be analyzed and
assessed stands alongside more conceptual issues relating to the
extent to which historians’ judgments and interpretations (for
example, the narratives in which historical facts are embedded)
are found in history or constructed by historians, and whether
“metajudgments” are possible as to whether the judgments of
certain historians about particular occurrences and events are
better than those of others.
Just as the historian’s task is to make statements that are
believed to be true, that are grounded in evidence but built up
through argument, so the auditor works with evidence and argument to make judgments. Alex. Arthur has recently proposed
that “the audit argument (including the elements of the argument that support the evidential statements) is a more important focus of fundamental audit enquiry than the evidential process itself” [Arthur, 2001, p. 263]. Traditionally, much weight
had been placed by audit theorists on the nature and quality of
audit evidence, but Arthur argues that theorists, and practitioners, tend to adopt a “common-sense” epistemological framehttps://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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work. This involves a naïve correspondence theory of truth,
where a statement is true because it states what is the case (and
“what is the case” is understood directly and unproblematically),
and may appeal to legal or scientific notions of evidence and
inference.4 Auditors’ attempts to clarify the status of evidence
and the processes of making inferences may take the form of
assertions (see, for example, SAS 400 [APB, 1995a]).
FIGURE 2
The Process of Financial Reporting and Auditing
Audit reports

Financial statements

Structured traces: accounting records

Unstructured traces: cheques, letters, memories, etc.

Activities, occurrences, happenings, events

Figure 2 has been constructed to bring out similarities between the audit process and the process of historical research.
The upward-pointing arrows show the process by which the underlying transactions and events undertaken by and affecting an
entity are transformed into the entity’s financial statements.
Transactions and events are evidenced by unstructured traces,
such as invoices. These will normally include all details about a
4
This is an argument developed by Power [1992] for the use of statistical
sampling techniques in auditing. McCullagh [1984, ch. 3] considers the use of
statistical inference in arriving at historical statements.
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transaction that the entity considers relevant, although they may
need to be supplemented by other documents and by human
memory. This closely parallels the situation for the historian,
who is likely to wish to triangulate the information about occurrences and events given by one trace against that given by other
traces. Unstructured traces are summarized in more structured
form in the entity’s accounting records. Much detail is omitted
(for example, the records may show only an invoice number and
total amount, not the goods or services provided) or summarized (for example, only the daily total for cash sales may be
recorded, rather than the individual sales transactions). Finally,
the financial statements are prepared from the accounting
records (with some input from knowledge of external and internal events that may have an impact on numbers emerging from
the accounting records, such as doubt about the collectibility of
an account receivable – hence the downward-pointing arrows
leading from the box representing financial statements in Figure
2). Many present-day accounting systems are designed so that
those charged with preparing the financial statements may do
so on the basis of balances and totals automatically generated
within the accounting records, and thus do not need to make
much if any reference to the underlying “primary” evidence of
transactions and events. Within these systems, a central purpose
of the accounting records is precisely to facilitate the preparation of the financial statements.5
In Figure 1, the upward arrows did not go all the way up to
the topmost level. This indicated that historiographies (in the
sense used in this paper) were not summaries of histories but
rather were opinions about histories. In Figure 2, the upward
arrows similarly do not go all the way to the topmost level, the
audit report. The contemporary audit report is an opinion about
the financial statements, not a summary of the statements. The
role of the auditor is not to prepare the financial statements,
and corporate law makes it clear that preparation is the responsibility of the corporate officers (in the UK, the directors). In
practice, auditors may become involved in preparation work,
but this leads to problems of independence, as auditors are then
required to give an opinion on financial statements for which
they are partially responsible. Figure 2 shows the parallels be-

5
In earlier periods, financial statements were less significant, and were
sometimes by-products of a practical need to close an old ledger and open a new
one [Yamey, 1970].

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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tween the audit process and that of historical research in the
shape of the downward-pointing arrows. The main source of
evidence on which the audit report is based is the financial
statements themselves. With the increasing use of analytical review [Dunn, 1996, pp. 133-135; Gray and Manson, 2000, pp.
333-343; Porter et al., 1996, pp. 165-169; SAS 410, APB, 1995b],
much audit work concentrates on ensuring the internal coherence of the financial statements, rather than their correspondence with some external state of affairs. Auditors examine the
accounting records as well, but to a lesser extent the primary
documents and other traces evidencing underlying transactions.
Reliance on systems of internal control allows the contemporary
auditor to assume that, as long as the control system may be
taken as reliable, the entries in the accounting records, and the
documents underlying these entries, accurately reflect real
transactions. With the increasing use of computer-based accounting systems, the traces left by transactions may exist only
in virtual form, or may be destroyed once they have been reflected in the accounting records.
As was the case in Figure 1, there is a shadowy arrow in
Figure 2, linking the audit report to the underlying transactions
and events. Auditors rarely observe routine transactions (and
the evidential status of observation is open to question, as the
presence of the auditor may distort the behavior of those involved in the transaction, making it unrepresentative of transactions in general). The auditor will be aware of external events
that may affect entities in general, such as natural disasters,
changes in tax and interest rates, and insolvency of major businesses, and can bring this awareness to bear on a particular
entity’s financial statements. The auditor rarely has direct personal access to the underlying activities and occurrences that
feed ultimately into the financial statements.
The audit process is, as Gray and Manson [2000, p. 333]
note, a “search for evidence”. Auditing standards, as well as
audit theorists, provide criteria for judging the status of different types of evidence.6 Some types of evidence, and evidence
from particular sources, will be considered more reliable than
other types of evidence. Auditors’ judgments as to the reliability
of evidence are quite similar to those made by historians. Auditors start from the presupposition that the accounting records

6
See, for example, SAS 400 Audit Evidence [APB, 1995a], and, for a summary and review of the theoretical literature, Arthur [2001, pp. 252-255].
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have been compiled with the basic purpose of accurately recording genuine transactions so as to facilitate the preparation of the
financial statements. Although auditors will assess the extent to
which the internal control systems are operating effectively, the
presumption is that this is the case, just as historians presume
that primary documentary records correctly record genuine occurrences. These presumptions may be rebutted if other evidence suggests that they are difficult to support, but at least
auditors have both longstanding judicial authority and more recent support in auditing standards for their approach.7 The responsibility of the auditor has been stated as being to “carry out
procedures designed to obtain sufficient appropriate audit evidence . . . to determine with reasonable confidence whether the
financial statements are free of material misstatement” (SAS
100.1 [APB, 1995c]).
Here, the analogy between the auditor and the historian
needs to be moderated. One of the qualities by which professional historians are judged is the care with which they address
their primary sources. Historians who are content that their
histories “are free of material misstatement” are likely to be
criticized by their peers on the basis that carelessness with
sources makes it difficult to lend credence to their conclusions.8
In contrast, the auditor will be prepared to overlook immaterial
errors in financial statements and in underlying records. Financial statements may “give a true and fair view” even when they
are known to contain errors. Justifying the audit opinion takes
on broader dimensions as auditors are increasingly being sued
for negligence [Napier, 1998]. Auditors must be able to show
that the audit was properly carried out and that the opinion was
properly based on evidence. Official auditing standards have become important in determining what constitutes a proper audit,
but whether a given audit has been properly undertaken is ulti-

7
In the UK, the leading judicial authority for this is the case re Kingston
Cotton Mill Company (No. 2) ([1896] 2 Ch. 279). See Napier [1998] for a review
of this case and others that determined the bounds of the auditor’s duties and
liabilities in the UK.
8
Evans [1997, pp. 116-122] gives extensive discussion to a case involving a
book by David Abraham The Collapse of the Weimar Republic [Abraham, 1981],
which was strongly criticized for misusing its sources. Abraham claimed that his
archival abuses did not affect his overall conclusions, but Evans [1997, p. 121]
expresses the view that “while Abraham did not deliberately falsify evidence, he
was extremely careless with it, far more so than is permissible in a work of
serious historical scholarship, or indeed in any work of history”.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7

14

Napier: Historian as auditor: Facts, judgments and evidence
Interfaces: Napier: The Historian as Auditor

145

mately a matter for the courts to decide in the light of expert
evidence of acceptable auditing practice. If the auditor is held to
have conducted the audit negligently, then substantial legal
damages may be payable.
Carelessness or negligence in undertaking historical research will rarely result in litigation.9 If historians cross the
threshold of using their sources in accordance with current professional practice, then they will be judged by the quality of
their arguments. Poor arguments, or poor use of sources, when
judged by the standards of peers, expose the historian to criticism and may be detrimental to a successful career. An adequate
evidence-gathering process and well-argued conclusions and interpretations will insulate the historian from criticism. Similarly, auditors who can demonstrate that the conduct of the
audit, in the form of evidence-gathering, meets the contemporary standards of adequacy will be judged in terms of how well
their conclusions are supported by the evidence they have collected. If the arguments are sound and the judgments tenable,
then auditors and historians alike will be able to resist criticism
that the outcome of their work (the audit report or the history)
is unjustified. This is so even if subsequent work, perhaps using
different evidence and developing different arguments, undermines the conclusions reached.
Despite some differences, the parallels between the auditor
and the historian are strong, and this suggests that arguments
about the foundations of historical research may be transferable
to the context of auditing. In the next section of this essay, I
shall consider two types of argument about historical research.
These are the relationship of historical evidence to the underlying occurrences and events, given that the historian in general
does not have direct access to the latter; and the nature of historical argument and interpretation. The arguments will be explored by reference to the work of two leading contemporary
writers on the philosophy of history: Keith Jenkins and C. Behan
McCullagh.
HISTORICAL FACTS, JUDGEMENT AND EVIDENCE
Keith Jenkins is best known for his book Re-thinking History
[Jenkins, 1991], a brief and clear exposition of important philosophical and methodological issues in historical research and
9
The David Irving case referred to in note 3 is one of the rare examples
where history is litigated.
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the post-modern response to these issues. He has also written
On “What is History?”: From Carr and Elton to Rorty and White
[Jenkins, 1995], a more extensive study that juxtaposes E. H.
Carr and Geoffrey Elton, as representatives of a more “modern”
and traditionalist conception of history, with Richard Rorty and
Hayden White (neither of whom is, strictly speaking, a historian) as representatives of the post-modern challenge. His recent
book Why History? Ethics and Postmodernity [Jenkins, 1999] is a
conscious polemic aimed at showing “that postmodern ways of
thinking probably signal the end of history” [p. 1], not in the
sense of writers such as Fukuyama [1992] that the major conflicts that defined the historical development of the world are
now over, but rather in the sense that history, as an attempt to
discover the unarguable truth about the past, is now conceptually impossible. Jenkins has also edited The Postmodern History
Reader [Jenkins, 1997].
Much of Jenkins’s more recent writing is presented as a
critique of the work of others, and his early book [Jenkins, 1991]
is more accessible than some of his later work. This book contains some fairly uncontentious claims as well as others more
open to debate. Jenkins emphasizes that there is a difference
between “the past” (“all that has gone on before everywhere”
[Jenkins, 1991, p. 6]) and “history” (“that which has been written/recorded about the past” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 6]), and that
history in the latter sense is a discourse (or series of discourses).
History exists as writing, and its sources are basically documentary, so there is a fundamental ontological distinction between
“the past” and “history”. Moreover, “the past and history are not
stitched into each other such that one and only one reading of
any phenomenon is entailed” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 8]. However,
traditional historians wish to “stitch together” the past and history, so it is necessary to investigate what are the limits to the
claims made by historians as to whether, and if so how, they
know that they have achieved an adequate “stitching together”.
Jenkins argues that it is necessary to consider issues of epistemology, methodology and ideology in conducting such an investigation.
Epistemologically, Jenkins notes the difficulty of actually
knowing the past when we are not presently experiencing it and
all our evidence comes in the form of texts (understood widely).
Jenkins goes so far as to suggest that unmediated knowledge of
the past is impossible, and appears to assume that only direct
experience can give unchallengable knowledge, an extreme form
of empiricism. Jenkins claims that historical knowledge “is
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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therefore likely to be tentative, and constructed by historians
working under all kinds of presuppositions and pressures which
did not, of course, operate on people in the past” [Jenkins, 1991,
p. 10]. Jenkins concedes that what historians can say is constrained by “the sources”, but he asserts that “the same events/
sources do not entail that one and only one reading has to follow” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 13]. Interestingly, Jenkins argues that, if
there were only one reading of the past, then, once this had been
discovered, history as a practice would indeed come to an end,
as he would see no point in simply repeating over and over
again this one reading. One important factor that prevents this
is that “through hindsight, we in a way know more about the
past than the people who lived in it” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 13]. We
can apply insights from the present to reinterpret the past, discovering what was forgotten and putting things together in different ways.
Overall, Jenkins rejects a simple correspondence theory of
historical truth, but he must in addition address the other epistemological question of what, if anything, justifies the historian
in making certain statements. He notes how a wide range of
writers on history – he quotes Geoffrey Elton, E. P. Thompson
and Arthur Marwick as representing the diversity of positions –
argue that historical knowledge is possible, and ground the possibility of such knowledge in rigorous application of “historical
method”. Yet Jenkins demonstrates that there is no unique
method on which all historians agree, not even a core of shared
methodological concepts. Finally, Jenkins argues that the key
question is not “What is history?”, but rather “Who is history
for?”. History means different things for different people, and is
mobilized for ideological purposes. Even an appearance of neutrality and objectivity may mask an ideological position –
Jenkins insists that the conclusion to Richard Evans’s In Defence
of History10 represents a bourgeois approach to history by taking
as self-evident what Jenkins considers as bourgeois (and therefore contingent) virtues [Jenkins, 1999, p. 100].
Jenkins does not deny that there are “facts about the past”
that we can definitely know (for example, dates of well-attested
events), but considers that “such facts, though important, are

10
“I will look humbly at the past and say despite them all: it really happened, and we really can, if we are very scrupulous and careful and self-critical,
find out how it happened and reach some tenable though always less than final
conclusions about what it all meant” [Evans, 1997, p. 253].
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‘true’ but trite within the larger issues historians consider”
[Jenkins, 1991, p. 32]. The larger issues are “not only what happened but how and why and what these things meant and
mean” [Jenkins, 1991, p. 33]. It is this unavoidably interpretive
aspect to historical writing that Jenkins considers central, but
interpretation is utterly discursive. It is not the “brute facts” but
how they are arrayed and located within historians’ narratives
that matter. Moreover, even the documentary sources that historians, in Jenkins’s view, “fetishise” do not have significance as
evidence until they are mobilized as evidence for or against particular interpretations.
Much of this, expressed in less polemic language, is accepted by many of the historians that Jenkins seeks to criticize.
Evans [1997], for example, is happy to concede some of these
points (earning further criticism from Jenkins [1999, pp. 104105] as effectively trying to have things both ways, while merely
exposing the inadequacies of the “traditional” view of history
still further). It is Jenkins’s more radical conclusions that pose
stumbling blocks for historiographers such as Evans. At the core
of these conclusions is the claim that “we don’t need a history in
order to ‘place ourselves’ in present times, or for thinking about
our future or . . . for articulating identities and programmes for
a reflexive, emancipatory politics ‘without foundations’”
[Jenkins, 1999, p. 202]. Jenkins goes beyond the view he attributes to some post-modernists “that after the end of modernity (and modernity-styled histories) we might well expect to see
as a constituent of postmodernity, postmodern histories”
[Jenkins, 1999, p. 10], to suggest that “to move into the future in
radical, emancipatory ways, postmodern imaginaries sans
histoire are all we need” [Jenkins, 1999, p. 10].
So the conclusion reached by Jenkins is a literal end of
history, not in the sense that the one and only true history has
been written (so historians have achieved their goal and can
close down their operations), but that a post-modern age is an
age with no need for history. This does not exclude the possibility of “imaginaries of the past”, but these make no claim to be
valuable because of their truth. Does this leave us with simply
the interplay of a myriad of interpretations, in which anything
goes? Although Jenkins has stated that some (indeed most) potential interpretations would be ruled out as inconsistent with
“brute facts” or involving failures of reasoning, this can only be
so for histories that, despite their post-modern pretensions,
share many of the epistemological, methodological and ideological positions of “modernist” history. An “imaginary” may not
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol29/iss2/7
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excite or move us, but it can scarcely be ruled out on the ground
that it is not true – truth simply does not enter the equation.
Thus Jenkins is quite correct to argue that a genuine post-modern history is impossible, so a post-modern world would be a
world beyond history, because history cannot avoid making
truth-claims, no matter how epistemologically problematic these
are. History involves making assertions that certain things did,
and other things did not, happen in the past, that they happened
in certain ways and not in others, and that they can be better
understood using particular interpretations rather than alternatives. This is essentially the argument that Arthur [2001, p. 265]
puts forward for auditing: “doing auditing properly means being
prepared to ultimately justify one’s methods, and . . . although
the details of this justification may be negotiated, there is an
ultimately non-negotiable discursive framework within which
this can be done.” If the arguments proposed by Jenkins lead to
the conclusion that history (post-modern and a fortiori modernist) is impossible, then it is likely that auditing will be impossible as well.
But are we obliged to accept the views of Jenkins? One
philosopher of history who believes we need not is C. Behan
McCullagh. His most recent book, The Truth of History [1998]
refers briefly to Jenkins, but is aimed more at defending the
view that “historical descriptions can be true of the past” and
that “historical interpretations . . . are not entirely subjective”
[McCullagh, 1998, pp. 1-2]. McCullagh’s significant contribution, which makes his work particularly appealing in the context
of a study of auditing and financial reporting, is that he considers that the issue is not just whether historical descriptions and
interpretations are “true” but whether they are “fair” as well. He
argues that historical statements are constrained by evidence,
and notes that there is no disagreement in practice about many
historical statements for which the evidence is “large and unambiguous” [McCullagh, 1998, p 22]. His conception of the practice
of historians is that:
The conclusion which historians generally adopt is that
if an historical statement is well supported by abundant
evidence, and much better supported than any alternative account, then the statement can be rationally accepted as very probably true. It is always logically possible that the evidence is misleading, or that their
beliefs about it and the other beliefs on which they base
their inference are mistaken. Indeed sometimes there is
reason to think that this is not just a logical, but a real
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possibility. At any rate, even when it is entirely rational
to believe an historical description is very probably
true, historians must admit that it could possibly be
false. Historical knowledge, like all our knowledge of
the world, is fallible [McCullagh, 1998, p. 23].
It is only if we want guarantees that our statements and
arguments can never be refuted, not just practically but logically, that we will claim that accepting any fallible historical
statement is irrational, and that without certainty there can be
no truth and hence no history. McCullagh would regard this
position of extreme skepticism as untenable. He recognizes that
our perceptions, our modes of argument and inference and our
methods of checking our conclusions are culturally shaped, but
he does not see this as fatal to the possibility that historical
statements may be true. He concedes that history is in this sense
subjective, but rejects the view that this implies that there is no
truth (or falsity) in history, and no way of assessing different
historical interpretations. Finally, historical statements are expressed in language and are thus constrained by language, but
the different conceptual frameworks imposed by different languages do not prevent historical statements from being true or
false merely because they might have been expressed differently.
As regards historians’ claims that they aim at the discovery
of the truth, McCullagh concludes that, without such a concern,
history would largely be pointless:
Why search for evidence of an historical period if it
cannot reveal the truth? Why weigh alternative implications carefully and rationally? Why distinguish plausible conjectures from well-supported facts? What is the
significance of the carefully “constructed” accounts of
the past which historians produce, if they cannot be
regarded as largely true descriptions of what happened?
[McCullagh, 1998, p. 57].
In a sense, McCullagh reaches a similar conclusion to Jenkins,
although while Jenkins sees such a conclusion as cause for celebration, McCullagh views it more as a reductio ad adsurdum of
the view that historical practices cannot lead to the generation
of knowledge. McCullagh qualifies the view that the goal of historical research is to make true statements. He notes that “descriptions are meant to be, not just literally true, but also fair
representations of their subject” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 57].
McCullagh has written more extensively about the issue of fairness in historical narratives in a self-contained essay
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[McCullagh, 1987], and in The Truth of History he provides only
a brief account. Essentially, historical statements are “fair” if
they are not “misleading”, and one instance of this is where
statements “ignore major features of the property being described, and thus give a misleading impression of the whole”
[McCullagh, 1998, p. 58]. An implicit aspect of fairness is avoidance of bias, particularly through omission of important facts:
“A fair representation is a balanced one, and historians are frequently at pains to correct the imbalance of previous histories”
[McCullagh, 1998, p. 58]. A fair description is also a complete
one, and McCullagh explains how this can be achieved without
having to mention absolutely everything about a historical subject, through ensuring that descriptions maintain a consistent
level of generality and detail, rather than placing the general and
the particular on the same level.
A critic of McCullagh might argue that the concept of historical truth he advances is not immune from skepticism and
relies heavily on the assertion that “It is not irrational to believe
certain things true of a subject just because there is a slight
chance that those beliefs are false” [McCullagh, 1998, p. 61].
Such a critic might argue further that the concept of historical
fairness is only sketched out, but even so appears to appeal to
notions such as balance, completeness, and absence of any tendency to mislead, that themselves are highly subjective and may
even be considered (à la Jenkins) to exemplify bourgeois ideology. Despite this, McCullagh’s appeal to both “truth” and “fairness” has obvious resonances to the auditor, and it is to this that
I now turn in the concluding section.
HISTORICAL EVIDENCE AND AUDIT EVIDENCE
If we accept the position of Keith Jenkins, then, except at
the trite level, there is no unique historical truth. If a search for
such a unique truth is constitutive of history, then history is
impossible and, in a post-modern world, we need to move to
“imaginaries”. Jenkins bases this argument in part on a claim
that history is inevitably ideological, but mainly on the epistemological disjuncture between history and its subject matter –
the past – which is simply inaccessible to us in the present, the
infinite scope for interpretation of the texts that represent the
historian’s sources, and the lack of consensus as to the methodological practices of the historian that are supposed to grant
security to the historian’s interpretations and conclusions.
These arguments seem equally to apply to auditing. There is
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again the disjuncture between the underlying transactions and
events that are allegedly being represented in financial statements and the traces that these transactions and events may or
may not be leaving. Whether or not the traces count as persuasive audit evidence depends on practice, but there is a lack of
consensus over what best audit practice is, and audit practice is
not static but has changed dramatically over time. Any particular set of audit practices is historically contingent rather than
necessary, and claims that practices are improving will be problematic. There are many different accounts that can be based on
a given set of traces and accounting records, just as there are
many different “accounts” that the historian can give. Although
some of these accounts can be ruled out as incoherent given
agreement on the underlying traces, there is no one true account. Thus far, the analogy between historical research and
auditing seems strong, but if we accept Jenkins’s conclusion
that, in a modernist world, history lacks foundations and, in a
post-modern world, there can be no history, then the analogy
seems to imply that auditing lacks foundations and, in a postmodern world, there can be no auditing.
McCullagh’s position is more favorable to auditing. He concedes that historians can “get it wrong”, but he argues that the
practices of historians are likely, if properly carried out, to
“maximise the chance of arriving at the truth” [McCullagh,
1998, p. 57]. The view that truth-seeking is constitutive of history, a stumbling-block to Jenkins, is an article of faith to
McCullagh. But truth needs to be tempered by fairness: mere
correctness is not enough. And judgments of fairness cannot so
easily be reduced to matters of practice and method. Drawing
out the analogy between history and auditing, the practices of
auditors, which are constantly developing, are likely, if properly
carried out, to maximize the chance of reaching a valid audit
opinion. It makes sense to argue, in the context of financial
reporting, that not only can the choice of accounting methods
lead to different numbers, but that such a choice can be deliberately made with a view of misleading. Hence the motives of the
preparers of financial statements need to be critiqued, not just
the statements themselves. “Arguments to the best explanation”
[McCullagh, 1984, pp. 15-44] may be valid within history, but
where no single viewpoint emerges as the “best explanation”,
then it would be unethical for the historian to present a single
position as the only position. Similarly, in financial reporting, if
there is no single true accounting (though there may be many
false accountings), then it would be unethical for the auditor to
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claim that a particular accounting represents “the truth”. It is
often forgotten that the British audit report (and those of countries following this wording) states that financial statements give
a true and fair view, not the true and fair view.
Auditing, then, faces similar epistemological and methodological difficulties to history. If history is logically impossible,
then so must auditing be. If we can decide when historical statements are justified (even though we concede that there is always
the remote chance that they are not true), then similar decisions
may be made about auditing judgments. Perhaps, as Arthur
[2001, p. 262] points out, it may be the case that “statutory
auditing, as it is currently conceived and required, is impossible”, but this does not make all auditing impossible. The challenge to fundamental theorists of auditing will be to learn from
theorists of history as to which discursive arguments are likely
to vindicate some form of auditing. In practice, just as historians
rely on a core supposition that most traces of the past were not
prepared to mislead but genuinely correlate with occurrences
and events, however open to interpretation they may be, so auditors rely on a core supposition that accounting records are not
prepared to mislead but genuinely correlate with underlying
transactions and events. Sometimes historians are deceived. So
are auditors, but only the extreme skeptic would argue that this
makes both history and auditing logical impossibilities.
Of course, it is open to both historians and auditors to
adopt methods that are likely to reduce the risk of falling victim
to deception (or indeed self-deception). What makes historical
accounting research possible is the same core belief as that of
the auditor, that, while accounting records must be approached
with awareness that they may have been subject to deliberate
manipulation or unintentional errors of omission or commission, they can usually be relied on as evidence of the underlying
occurrences to which we no longer (if we ever could) have direct
immediate access. An a priori belief that financial statements,
accounting records and accounting documents can never be relied on in this way on would make the practice of auditing
incoherent. The historical accounting researcher could still comment on the documents and texts that are available for analysis,
but only as texts, not as telling us anything about any real occurrences or events. Such a “history of accounts” would focus on
the physical artifacts that are considered to be accounting
records, emphasizing accounts as texts. It would not be correct
to deny altogether the textual nature of accounting, and writers
such as Cooper and Puxty [1996, p. 306, following Derrida and
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Baudrillard] have helpfully pointed out the danger posed by historians’ “jostling for space, claiming the status of true descriptors of ‘what happened’”. Yet I would suggest that a purely textual history of accounting would be much less productive than
one that takes the texts not as things in themselves but rather as
evidence for activities, occurrences, happenings and events. Historians of accounting continue to express views on how they,
and other historians, use sources as evidence. Sometimes, these
views are unreflective and “common-sensical”. Awareness of
general debates over how historians use evidence will help to
strengthen not only historical accounting research but also,
through our interaction with our auditing colleagues, auditing
practice.
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